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 Sub-optimal international portfolio allocations and cost of capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Finance theory suggests that the optimal international equity portfolio investment by home 
and foreign investors reduces cost of capital through international risk sharing and capital 
market integration. However, the empirical evidence is inconsistent with theory as a number 
of studies show investors exhibit cross-country biases in their international portfolio 
investments, known as home and foreign biases. In this study we investigate the implications 
of home and foreign biases on cost of capital. Using data from 44 countries over a period of 
2001-2014, we provide strong evidence that countries which experience higher home bias are 
associated with a higher cost of capital. Similarly, we also find that countries which are more 
favoured by foreign investors, relative to the theoretical predictions, are associated with a 
lower cost of capital. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) suggests that financial liberalization, 
which formally allows inward and outward international portfolio investments, should 
integrate the domestic capital market with world capital markets. Increasing market 
integration, driven by financial globalization, should reduce a country's cost of capital (see 
Errunza and Losq, 1985; Errunza and Miller, 2000).1 Errunza (2001) notes that the essence of 
the inverse relation between cost of capital and market integration is the migration from local 
pricing and narrow shareholder base to global pricing and a more diversified international 
shareholder base enhancing international risk sharing. Further, Bekaert and Harvey (2003) 
suggest that when domestic capital market integrate with world capital markets; the volatility 
of world capital markets become more relevant relative to domestic capital market in the 
pricing of local securities. As the volatility of world capital market is lower than local capital 
market, cost of capital should be lower for a country which is more integrated with world 
capital markets. 
Although there is a strong theoretical case for a resultant fall in cost of capital, 
Bekaert and Harvey (2003) note that despite formal financial liberalization, i.e. removal of 
direct legal restrictions, there can be significant indirect barriers (such as information 
asymmetry, political and financial policy risks, higher trading costs etc.) to international 
portfolio investments. Such indirect barriers deter investors from investing optimally across 
the global markets leading to market segmentation or only mild integration. In terms of 
optimality of portfolio allocation, the ICAPM prescribes that equity portfolio investors should 
hold a well-diversified world portfolio as the benchmark (see Solnik, 1974; Adler and 
Dumas, 1983; Lewis, 1999). However, in the presence of indirect barriers to international 
                                                          
1 Cost of capital is an important input in capital budgeting evaluation of investment projects. Higher cost of 
capital leads to lower net present value undermining the acceptance possibilities of prospective projects. Such 
non-feasibility of investment projects, particularly owing to higher cost of capital, harms the prospects of 
making positive effects in the real economy leading to slower growth and lost employment opportunities. 
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investments, world capital markets are, to some extent, segmented as equity portfolio 
investors in both the developed and emerging markets exhibit varying degrees of home and 
foreign biases in their international portfolio allocations.2 Home bias relates to the 
phenomenon of sub-optimally higher home investments by domestic investors, i.e. over-
weighting of the home market relative to the ICAPM benchmark. Similarly, foreign bias 
refers to the tendency of foreign investors to over or under allocate foreign markets compared 
to the ICAPM benchmark (for details on the difference between home and foreign bias, see 
Dahlquist et al. 2003; Chan et al. 2005 and this discussed further in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 
of this paper).3  
A number of studies theoretically and empirically provide evidence on the partial 
integration/segmentation of domestic capital markets from world capital markets, thereby 
inhibiting optimal international risk sharing (see Errunza and Losq, 1985; Stulz, 1999; Chaieb 
and Errunza, 2007). Clearly, drawing on evidence of sub-optimal international portfolio 
allocations and the varying degree of market integration/segmentation, we test the following 
two related hypotheses.  
 
H1:  Higher degree of home bias is associated with higher cost of capital.  
H2:  Higher degree of foreign bias is associated with lower cost of capital.  
 
In other words, theory suggests that the higher degree of home bias, implying lower 
international risk sharing (i.e. lower integration with world capital markets), should be 
associated with a higher cost of capital. Similarly, economic reasoning also conjecture that 
                                                          
2 See Bekaert et al. (2011) and Carrieri et al. (2013) for recent evidence on market segmentation. For evidence 
on causes of home and foreign/biases, see Lewis (1999), Chan et al. (2005), Bekaert and Wang (2010), Mishra 
.LPHWDODQG2¶+DJDQ-Luff and Berrill (2015). 
3 In our study, higher home bias refers to greater home allocations relative to benchmark whereas higher foreign 
bias refers to higher foreign cross-country allocations relative to benchmark. Hence, higher home bias from 
domestic investors should lead to greater market segmentation but higher foreign bias from foreign investors 
should lead to greater market integration.  
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higher levels of foreign bias, suggesting higher international risk sharing (i.e. higher 
integration with world capital markets), should be associated with a lower cost of capital.  
Using five proxies of cost of capital and extensive robustness tests, our study provides 
a comprehensive investigation of how variations in sub-optimal international portfolio 
allocations (i.e. home and foreign bias) affect the cross-country cost of capital. In addition to 
using the two conventional proxies for cost of capital, i.e. dividend yield and historical risk 
premium, we also use the sovereign bond rating as an implied cost of capital, an expected 
country equity risk measure (see Jewel and Livingston, 1998; Damodaran, 2012), and finally 
LQRXUUREXVWQHVVWHVWZHXVH7RELQ¶V4DVDQDGGLWLRQDOYDOXDWLRQSUR[\FDSWXULQJWKHLQYHUVH
feature of cost of capital.  The use of multiple finance based proxies help address some of the 
limitations and sensitivities of accounting based implied cost of capital proxies. The proxy 
variables account for country default risk and the use of these proxies offers new insights 
with regards to the implications of foreign and home bias on finance based proxy variables.  
Our study reports the following findings. First, the univariate figures of all cost of 
capital measures strongly suggest that developed countries exhibit lower cost of capital 
relative to their emerging market counterparts. This implies that compared to investments in 
emerging markets, investors apply significantly lower value of discount rates when 
evaluating projects in developed markets. Second, in terms of international risk sharing, 
portfolio investors in developed markets enjoy significant international risk sharing as 
reported by cross-FRXQWU\ILJXUHVRIKRPHDQGIRUHLJQELDVHV'HYHORSHGPDUNHWV¶SRUWIROLR
investors exhibit significantly lower home bias relative to those in emerging markets. 
Similarly, foreign portfolio investors seem to prefer developed markets more in their cross-
country equity portfolio allocations compared to emerging markets. More importantly, we 
supplement the literature by providing evidence that the phenomena of sub-optimal 
international allocations are not only observed in the aggregate and macro data (see Chan et 
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al. 2005 and Bekaert and Wang, 2010) but also by individual global equity funds, which are 
managed by sophisticated managers with the sole purpose of optimal global diversification. 
Finally, consistent with theory, our empirical analyses provide strong evidence that 
higher degree of home bias is associated with a higher cost of capital. This strongly indicates 
that countries which exhibit home bias in their international portfolio investments display 
lower degree of integration with world capital markets leading to higher cost of capital. 
Correspondingly, we also find that higher degree of foreign bias towards a host country (i.e. 
more favourable allocation by foreign investors) is related to a lower cost of capital 
benefiting from higher degree of market integration. 
Our study makes two important contributions to the literature. First, existing studies 
predominantly examine the causes of home and foreign bias (see Chan et al. 2005; Gelos and 
Wei, 2005; Bekaert and Wang, 2010) investigating the implications of these biases. In this 
paper we investigate whether varying degrees of home and foreign biases have implications 
for cost of capital. The relevant literature is either based on event studies, investigating how 
cost of capital changes in the post financial liberalization period, or analyses the influence of 
depository receipts on cost of capital.4 Similarly, a number of studies investigate the impact 
of floating depository receipts (American/Global Depositary Receipts ADRs/GDRs) on cost 
of capital.5 Unlike these studies, in this paper we use direct measures of sub-optimal 
international portfolio investments (i.e. home and foreign bias) to study their effects on cost 
of capital. The paper extends Chan et al. (2009) by introducing new finance based proxy 
variables for cost of capital and we also control for local risk factors. The finance based proxy 
                                                          
4 For example, Kim and Singal (2000) and Chari and Henry (2004) show that the post financial liberalization 
cost of capital of the liberalized economy significantly decreases. Stulz (1999) and Henry (2000) also find 
similar results, suggesting that the reduction in cost of capital is driven by increased risk-sharing and improved 
corporate governance. De Jong and de Roon (2005) show that the increased time-varying integration (i.e. the 
process of gradual financial liberalization of the domestic equity market) is associated with a reduction in cost of 
capital.    
5 For example, Foerster and Karolyi, (1999), Errunza and Miller (2000) and Karolyi (2004) demonstrate that 
firms issuing ADRs experience a fall in cost of capital, driven by the increased global risk sharing effect. For 
more recent evidence see Edison and Warnock (2008) and Hail and Leuz (2009). 
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variables are used to investigate the possibility of causality with the biases. We went further 
to provide robustness to the study by examining the implications of global fund foreign bias 
on firm performance YLD7RELQ¶V4. We also strengthen Chan et al. (2009) by addressing the 
concern of possible reverse causality using lagged values, dynamic generalized methods of 
moment estimation (GMM), and the Heckman selection model. 
Second, the aggregated measures of foreign and home bias used in existing studies do 
not consider the individual objectives or focus of funds.  The use of the fund level data 
provides new insight with regards to the implications on cost of capital of funds that seek 
global diversification but deviate from holding ICAPM benchmark portfolio weight. 
Although on a theoretical basis, each fund should be globally diversified, in practice DIXQG¶V
objective could be single country, single region or global diversification, targeted to suit the 
preferences of different investor groups. For example, if the focus of the fund is 
diversification only within the European Union (EU), it will have no allocations across 
countries outside the EU. Additionally, if the focus of a fund is on a single country or region, 
it will significantly affect the aggregate measure of home and foreign bias. To address this 
issue of potential bias in the measure of sub-optimal allocations of international investors, we 
construct a highly conservative foreign bias measure that uses unique micro firm level global 
funds¶ allocation data across 44 countries. The global funds that we use have the sole 
objective of global diversification across all investable countries as most of them use the 45 
FRXQWULHV¶06&,$&LQGH[.  The use of funds data that focus mainly on global diversification 
provide the most restrictive and unbiased measure of foreign bias, significantly reducing what 
we refer to as the fund-focus bias in the construction of foreign bias measures used in the 
existing literature.  
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
theoretical framework we use to model cost of capital against home and foreign biases. 
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Section 3 describes the data used in our study.  Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical 
results and finally, section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Theoretical framework  
Following the theoretical framework of Lewis (1999) the standard model showing the pricing 
relation against the sub-optimal holdings of all domestic investors in country l is shown in 
equation (1) below:6 
 
 
where ܧሺݎ௟ሻ  is country l¶V ULVN SUHPLXP ߛ is  relative risk aversion parameter which is 
assumed to be identical for all investors in the country l. ݓ௟ is the proportion of domestic 
investors portfolio allocated to domestic equities of country l.  ݓ௟כ is country l¶VPDUNHWVKDUH
in the world market portfolio. ܸܽݎሺݎ௟ሻ is the variance of local market return of country l with ܥ݋ݒሺݎ௟ǡ ݎ௪ሻ being the covariance between local market return and world market return (ݎ௪) . 
If we assume that domestic investors in country l only invest in local securities then equation 
(1) reduces to: 
 
 
When local investors invest mainly in domestic equities, the expected return of their 
portfolio is proportional to the variance of the domestic market return. This conjecture in the 
pricing modelling is similar to that of an asset pricing modelling in a completely segmented 
market. Equation (2) shows the impact of complete home bias on cost of capital. In the 
absence of international diversification, the price of the domestic market portfolio is 
determined only by its own return variance.  However, in a situation where local investors do 
                                                          
6
 As it is standard model we do not report the derivation. 
 ܧሺݎ௟ሻ ൌ ߛ ݓ௟ െ ݓ௟כ ? െ ݓ௟כ ܸܽݎሺݎ௟ሻ ൅ ߛ  ? െ ݓ௟ ? െ ݓ௟כ ܥ݋ݒሺݎ௟ǡ ݎ௪ሻ (1)  
 ܧሺݎ௟ሻ ൌ ߛܸܽݎሺݎ௟ሻ (2)  
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not exhibit home bias and keep domestic equity in rHODWLRQ WR WKH FRXQWU\¶V VKDUH LQ the 
world-market portfolio, i.e.ݓ௟ ൌ ݓ௟כ, equation (1) is then expressed as:  
 
 
This is the case where domestic investors do not exhibit any home bias. Such relation 
signifies that domestic investors are diversifying their portfolio internationally, implying the 
local stock market being fully integrated with the world capital market.  
Although the above two situations (i.e. equation 2 and 3) are rare cases, in reality 
equity investors demonstrate varying degrees of home bias (Chan et al. 2005). The percentage 
of their domestic equity holdings falls within the interval of (ݓ௟כǡ  ?) and thus equation (1) 
could be written as:    
 
 
Equation (4) demonstrates the association between the degrees of home bias on cost of 
capital. The greater the value of the weight the ORFDOLQYHVWRUVKROGWKHLUGRPHVWLFFRXQWU\¶V
equities (ݓ௟), the higher the degree of home bias they exhibit.7 The term (ݓ௟ െ ݓ௟כሻȀሺ ? െ ݓ௟כሻ 
in equation (4) could be interpreted as the degree of market integration within the framework 
of Bekaert and Harvey (1995). A country with a lower level of integration will have a larger 
value ofݓ௟ leading to higher degree of home bias. Such higher level of home bias or market 
segmentation will therefore result in higher cost of capital if the following condition prevails: 
 
 
                                                          
7 Bekaert and Harvey (1995) develop a regime-switching model to show the effects of the differing proportions 
of market segmentation which is equal to equation (4). 
 ܧሺݎ௟ሻ ൌ ߛܥ݋ݒሺݎ௟ǡݎ௪ሻ (3)  
 ܧሺݎ௟ሻ ൌ ߛ ݓ௟ െ ݓ௟כ ? െ ݓ௟כ ሼܸܽݎሺݎ௟ሻ െ ܥ݋ݒሺݎ௟ǡ ݎ௪ሻሽ ൅ ߛܥ݋ݒሺݎ௟ǡ ݎ௪ሻ (4)  
 ܸܽݎሺݎ௟ሻ ൐ ܥ݋ݒሺݎ௟ǡ ݎ௪ሻ (5)  
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It is well documented in the literature that the ܥ݋ݒሺݎ௟ǡ ݎ௪ሻ is smaller than ܸܽݎሺݎ௟ሻ (see Stulz, 
1999). 
 So far the above framework only focuses on allocation by domestic investors in 
domestic market. In theory foreign investors should also benchmark the optimal allocation, 
i.e. ݓ௟כ for country l. However, studies (e.g. Chan et al. 2005) show that in case of bilateral 
foreign portfolio investments, foreign investors relatively under (over) allocate the 
benchmark weight suggested by ICAPM exhibiting what is termed as foreign bias. Suppose if 
the foreign allocation from country k into country l is ݓ௞௟ then foreign bias for country l 
exhibited by investors in country k is defined asሺݓ௞௟Ȁݓ௟כሻ. This ratio could be negative 
(under-allocation) or positive (over-allocation). Clearly, on average, higher degree of foreign 
bias from all foreign investors for country l imply relatively lower home bias. This suggests 
that higher (lower) degree of foreign bias should be associated with a higher (lower) degree 
of market integration, which in turn, should be related to lower (higher) cost of capital for 
investors in country l. Thus, this measure of foreign bias constructed in the literature should 
be inversely related to cost of capital. 
 
3. Data 
 
We describe the four different costs of capital measures we use in our primary analysis,8 
followed by a measure of home bias and two measures (using macro and micro data) of 
foreign biases. Finally, following the existing literature we discuss the control variables that 
could potentially compete with our home bias and foreign biases measures. 
 
3.1. Proxies of cost of capital 
                                                          
8
 We also use an additional proxy (7RELQ¶V4) for cost of capital in our robustness section 4.4.1. 
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We use the following four variables as proxies for country level cost of capital: 
historical realized market risk premium, a sovereign bond credit-risk rating based implied 
cost of capital, 'DPRGDUDQ¶V (2012) default spread-based country risk premium, and the 
dividend yield. 
 
3.1.1. Historical realized market risk premium 
The first measure we use is the historical realized return of the marketሺܪܴܴ݉) which 
is the historical average of excess country equity market return over the risk free rate. For 
each year, the yearly average stock market returns are computed using the monthly US dollar 
country stock market indices sourced from Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI). 
Since all returns are denominated in US dollars, we use the yearly average of the monthly 
return on US Treasury bills as a proxy for the risk free rate for all countries. One of the 
fundamental assumptions of using the historical risk premium as a proxy for the expected risk 
premium is that the long term average premium is mean reverting. Although this measure can 
be used for developed markets where long historical data are available, yielding a lower 
degree of standard errors, it is not appropriate for most of the emerging markets, which have 
a relatively shorter history of stock return data. We address this issue by using alternative 
average risk premium measures based on sovereign country credit risk ratings. The first is the 
proxy of implied cost of capital, estimated using the sovereign credit ratings (rCred). The 
VHFRQG LV 'DPRGDUDQ¶V  FRXQWU\ ULVN SUHPLXP ZKLFK LV EDVHG RQ VRYHUHLJQ GHIDXOW
spread but adjusted for relative risk of equity versus ERQGPDUNHWV¶H[SHFWHGUHWXUQ(CERP).   
 
3.1.2.  Sovereign credit-risk rating measures of cost of capital 
Following Jewel and Livingston (1998), for each country we use sovereign bond risk 
rating, denominated in foreign currency, as the proxy of implied cost of capital. The basic 
idea is that sovereign country credit ratings display fundamental forward looking information 
11 
 
on country¶V risk and, unlike expected returns measures based on historical data, do not suffer 
from the noise of past shocks to a country's growth opportunities. Previous studies show that 
country credit-risk rating correlates highly with implied cost of capital, and thereby could be 
used as an alternative proxy of cost of capital.9 We obtain country credit-risk ratings of 10-
year local currency denominated sovereign bonds (see Damodaran, 2012). Following Reeb et 
al. (2001) we convert the qualitative credit ratings into numerical values (AAA=1, AA+=2, 
AA=3«. D=22) and take their natural log into our regressions. We expect a positive 
(negative) association between rCred and home bias (foreign bias) in our estimations.  
 
3.1.3.  Country equity risk premium 
We also use the country equity risk premium (ܥܧܴܲ) constructed and maintained by 
Damodaran (2012). The ܥܧܴܲ measure follows the concept of demanding incremental CERP 
for investing in a particular market relative to a mature market as a base country. Damodaran 
(2012) uses the United States as the base country and S&P 500 as the representative stock 
market. For each country, the incremental premium relative to the base country, which 
reflects the additional country risk premium, is computed by taking the default spread (over 
the base country) IROORZLQJ0RRG\¶VULVNUDWLQJVRIVRYHUHLJQERQGV in local currency. The 
resultant premium is subsequently scaled by the ratio of WKHFRXQWU\¶Vequity market volatility 
to bond market volatility. For instance, in calculating the equity risk premium for Brazil, 
Damodaran (2012) first determines the default risk premium spread of a 10-year local 
currency denominated government bond over the 10-year US sovereign bond. The resultant 
premium is subsequently adjusted for the additional risk of the equity market by scaling it 
with the ratio of standard deviations RI %UD]LO¶V HTXLty to bond market. The standard 
deviations of the bond market are estimated using returns on the 10-year sovereign bonds and 
                                                          
9 For example, Hail and Leuz (2006) find the sovereign credit ratings measure has an average correlation 
coefficient of 0.64 with the implied cost of capital. Further, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) also suggest that 
country credit rating is a reliable proxy for ex ante risk exposure, particularly for segmented emerging countries. 
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that of the local equity market using the national stock index, e.g. Bovespa for Brazil. For 
more details see Damodaran (2012). 
 
3.1.4.  Dividend yield 
Following extensive use in the literature (see Bekaert and Harvey, 2000) we use 
dividend yieldሺܦܻ) as an additional proxy for cost of capital. Bekaert and Harvey (2005) 
also show that relative to historical realized returns, DY is a reasonable proxy for cost of 
capital, particularly for emerging markets where returns are relatively more volatile than 
those of their developed market counterparts. We obtain ܦܻ data for all countries from 
Thompson Reuters and the World Federation of Exchanges.  
 
3.2. Home and foreign bias measures 
We use three different datasets to construct the measure of home and foreign bias 
exhibited by portfolio investors in the country allocations. The first dataset is the standard 
aggregate country level cross-country equity portfolio holding (in USD millions) data 
sourced from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The CPIS collect data on stocks of cross-border holdings of equities 
for 76 countries (see Bekaert and Wang, 2010). We use the annual cross-country portfolio 
holdings CPIS data for the period 2001-2014 to construct our equity home bias (CPIS_HB) 
and equity foreign bias (CPIS_FB) measures, as described below. Dictated by the availability 
of data for our key cost of capital proxies and other control variables, we use data on 44 
countries-excluding only one of the 45 countries comprising the MSCI All Country Index. 
Second, we use unique fund level country allocation data from Emerging Portfolio 
Fund Research (EPFR) to create the JOREDO IXQG¶V IRUHLJQELDV GF_FB) measure.10 EPFR 
provides asset allocation data trading in traditional and alternative funds domiciled globally. 
                                                          
10 EPFR is used in finance research to address a number of different issues (see, Gelos and Wei, 2005; 
Jotikasthira et al. 2012). 
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The aim of the country allocations is to provide a complete and comprehensive picture of 
fund managerV¶ allocations driving global markets. We use the yearly average (based on 
monthly observations) country allocations of 122 global equity funds ± the total size of all the 
funds approximately US$120 billion. These funds are domiciled across nine countries for the 
period of 2001-2014. Since these are purely global funds, we expect the foreign bias to be 
minimal compared to the CPIS aggregate data which iQFOXGH YDULRXV XQGLVFORVHG IXQGV¶
type and style. To maintain consistency with the CPIS data, we adopt the EPFR sample 
period (2001-2014). Furthermore, since the funds are domiciled in nine countries, we are 
unable to construct a robust measure of home bias due to the smaller number of observations 
for our empirical analysis (90 observations only).11 Finally, for the construction of ICAPM 
benchmark allocation, we use the country level market capitalization figures for S&P/IFC 
obtained from the World Development Indicator (WDI) of the World Bank.  
3.2.1. Equity home bias 
The equity home bias (EHB) measure captures the extent to which domestic investors 
overweight their domestic equity market relative to the prescription of the ICAPM 
benchmark. Following the existing literature (see Ahearne et al. 2004; Chan et al. 2005) we 
define home bias as: 
 
where ݓ௟௟௧ represents GRPHVWLFLQYHVWRUV¶weightings in the domestic market capitalization of 
country݈ for the period t and is defined as: 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Detailed summary information on EPFR funds, for instance, the yearly average size of the funds is available 
from the author on request. 
 ܧܪܤ௟௧ ൌ  ൬ௐ೗೗೟ௐ೗೟כ ൰  (6)  
 ݓ௟௟௧ ൌ ݄௟௟௧ܩܲܪ௟௧ (7)  
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where ݄௟௟௧ is the market value of domestic stocks held by all domestic investors in their 
domestic market l and ܩܲܪ௟௧ is the total market value of domestic LQYHVWRUV¶ global holdings 
for the period t across all 44 countries including domestic market. ݓ௟௧כ  is the ICAPM world 
benchmark allocation for country l for time period t, which is the same for all investors in all 
countries and is defined as:  
 
 
where ܿܽ݌௟௧ is the total market capitalization of country l and is obtained from WDI. 
A value of zero for ܧܪܤ௟௧ in equation (6) indicates that investors have no bias towards their 
home market, while positive values show the presence of home bias. Equation (8) shows the 
market capitalization of country l divided by the market capitalization of the world-market 
portfolio.12 
It is worth noting that CPIS only reports the bilateral foreign equity portfolio holdings 
with no investments in domestic markets for each host country l. Following the literature (see 
Fidora et al. 2007) the construction of domestic holdings (݄௟௟௧) and global portfolio holdings 
of domestic investors (ܩܲܪ௟௧ ) are as follows: 
 
 
where ܯܥܣ ௟ܲ௧ is the market capitalization of equities issued in country l and ܨܲܪ௞௟௧ǡ௞ஷ௟ is 
the holdings of all equities of country l by foreign investors domiciled in country k. The ܩܲܪ௟௧ is constructed as: 
                                                          
12 In our study the world-market portfolio is the sample 44 countries. 
 ݓ௟௧כ ൌ ܿܽ݌௟௧ ? ܿܽ݌௟௧ସସ௟ୀଵ  (8)  
 ݄௟௟௧ = ܯܥܣ ௟ܲ௧ ±  ? ܨܲܪ௞௟௧ǡ௞ஷ௟ସଷ௞ୀଵ  (9)  
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ܨܲܪ௟௞௧ is the holdings of foreign securities (k) by investors domiciled in country l at time t. 
As theܧܪܤ௟௧ is constructed using CPIS data, we denote this variable as CPIS_HB in our 
empirical analysis. 
 
3.2.2. Equity foreign bias 
Relative to the ICAPM prediction, equity foreign bias implies the disproportionate 
allocation of investors domiciled in country k into the foreign securities of countries l. 
Following Chan et al. (2005) we compute the equity foreign bias as: 
 
 
where ݓ௞௟௧ is the allocation of country k¶V LQYHVWRUV LQHTXLWLHV LVVXHGE\FRXQWU\ l for the 
period t and is defined as: 
 
where  ݄௞௟௧ denotes country݇¶VLQYHVWRUV¶stockholdings of equities in a foreign country݈ for 
the period t. ݓ௟௧כ  , as defined in equation (8), is the ICAPM benchmark allocation for 
investing in country l for period t . 
For each pair countries, i.e., kl, equity foreign bias could be either positive, where 
IRUHLJQLQYHVWRUV¶ (in country k) overweight foreign equity market more than that suggested 
by the implied global weight, or it could be negative, where foreign investors underweight 
 
ܩܲܪ௟௧ ൌ ݄௟௟௧ ൅ ෍ ܨܲܪ௟௞௧ǡ௟ஷ௞ସଷ௞ୀଵ  
 
(10)  
 ܧܨܤ௞௟௧ ൌ  ൬ௐೖ೗೟ௐ೗೟כ ൰  (11)  
 ݓ௞௟௧ ൌ ݄௞௟௧ ? ݄௞௟௧ସଷ௟ୀଵ  (12)  
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their investment away from the implied global weight.13 For regression analysis we take the 
average equity foreign bias (ܣܧܨܤ௟௧) exhibited by all source country investors (k «Q) for 
the country l for each period t as shown below: 
 
 
Foreign bias measures based on CPIS-,0)DQG(3)5*OREDO)XQGV¶GDWDDUHGHQRWHG
as ܥܲܫܵ ?ܨܤ andܩܨ ?ܨܤ respectively. The number of source countries, i.e. n, for CPIS_FB is 
43 (i.e. the same as host countries, excluding the country for which foreign bias is 
measured,݇ ് ݈ ) and the n for the GF_FB, i.e. the number of funds exhibiting foreign bias 
for each country, is 121, excluding the fund if its country of domicile is the same as the 
country of allocation, i.e. ݇ ് ݈.  
 
3.3.  Control variables 
We use several control variables which could potentially compete with our home and 
foreign bias measures. Following Kang and Stulz (1997), we use the log of market 
capitalization (MKTCap) in USD millions to control for the size and information of the 
market. Hail and Leuz (2006) note that a larger stock market provides more transparent 
information which could potentially reduce information costs and, hence, lower cost of 
capital. We expect market capitalization (MKTCap) to be negatively related to cost of capital 
measures. CAPM predicts a positive association between a firm's beta and risk premium. We 
compute beta for each market (MSCI country index return) against the MSCI All Country 
World index return using monthly data for the past five years. The resulting covariance is 
                                                          
13
 Note, on aggregate the foreign bias should be negative for each country (l) which exhibits home bias. 
However, given the fact that CPIS does not report the holding all countries in the world, on average, the foreign 
bias could be positive or negative. These figures are also reported in the existing literature (see Chan et al. 2005; 
Lau et al. 2010).  
 
 ܣܧܨܤ௟௧ ൌ  ? ܧܨܤ௞௟௧௡௟ୀ௞ ݊  (13)  
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then divided by the variance of MSCI world index return. Following Gebhardt et al. (2001), 
we use book-to-market ratio (BM) to capture differences in growth opportunities. High BM 
captures lower growth opportunities, lower accounting conservatism, and high perceived risk. 
We calculate BM as the log country level ratio of book-to-market. We construct the total 
country level book value by aggregating the constituents of each market and scale it by the 
total market capitalization. The book value figures are from Worldscope. 
Consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), we use the previous year's stock 
performance (Retn_1) to capture the momentum effect on cost of capital. We measure Retn_1 
as the average MSCI monthly index return over the past year. We further use one-year lagged 
inflation risk (Infl_1) to control for macroeconomic effect. We control for inflation (Infl_1) to 
ensure our analysis is not driven by variations in expected inflation rates (Brandt and Wang, 
2003 present evidence that equity risk premium is positively related to the inflation rate). We 
obtain one-year lagged annual inflation rates for each country from WDI. To control for the 
correlation between exchange return14 and equity return, we compute a three-year moving 
average covariance between the monthly stock market index return and the monthly 
depreciation of the domestic currency with respect to the dollar. The exchange rates are 
sourced from Thompson Reuters (see also Adler and Dumas, 1984). 
It is well established in the literature that investors demand a liquidity premium for 
investing in markets with different levels of liquidity (see Gibson and Mougeot, 2004; 
Bekaert et al. 2006; Chordia et al. 2011). We control for market liquidity using the turnover 
ratio (Turn) obtained from WDI and World Federation Exchanges (WFE). Earlier studies 
(Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; Chan et al. 2005) argue that trade openness may drive cost of 
capital. As such, we further control for market integration (financial and economic) on cost of 
                                                          
14 Exchange rate risk is controlled in the ICRG financial risk measure which includes exchange rate stability 
sub-component. This sub-component (0-10) measures the appreciation or depreciation of a currency against the 
US dollar (against the Euro in the case of the USA) over a calendar year or the most recent 12-month period is 
calculated as percentage change. 
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FDSLWDOE\XVLQJ WKH ORJDYHUDJHRIDFRXQWU\¶V annual exports and imports scaled by GDP 
(LSMI). We also expect that countries with higher economic growth would attract foreign 
investors, implying global potential risk-sharing owing to growth-reputation, which may 
reduce cost of capital. We control for economic growth using the real gross domestic product 
growth (RGDPG) sourced from WDI. 
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that countries with sound and effective legal systems 
protect outside investors from expropriation risk. We use the International Country Risk 
Group (ICRG) rule of law and order (Law) index (0-6) to capture the variations in the quality 
and observance of legal rules. We obtain the data from 3ROLWLFDO 5LVN 6HUYLFHV *URXS¶s 
country risk ratings. Further, studies such as that of Erb et al. (1996), also note that 
differences in country risk ratings may influence equity returns. Following Erb et al. (1996), 
we use three broad country risk measures, i.e. political risk (PolRisk), economic policy risk 
(EconRisk) and financial policy risk (FinRisk) to control for their effect on cost of capital.  
The objective of the broad country risk ratings is to provide a common but forward 
looking variable for assessing the political, economic and financial policy stability in 
countries covered by ICRG. The political risk rating is rated on a scale of 0-100 and 
comprises 12 components.15 The economic policy risk is measured on a scale of 0-50 points 
and incorporates five potential sources of economic risk (GDP per head, real GDP growth, 
inflation rate, budget balance as a % of GDP, and current account as a % of GDP). The 
financial policy risk measure, which is also measured on a scale of 0-50, captures five 
potential sources of financial risk components (foreign debt as a % of GDP, exchange rate 
stability, foreign debt as a % of total export and services, current account as a % of exports 
                                                          
15 The political risk rating captures issues such as government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment 
profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tension, law and order, 
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality. 
19 
 
and services, and international liquidity). For all the broad country risk measures, the annual 
average based on the monthly ratings is used in this study.16  
We also include the Small-minus-Big (SMB) and High-minus-Low (HML) measures 
to control for the size and value effect. For each market, SMB is the difference in annualized 
average of the monthly returns on the Standard & Poor¶V (S&P) total return index on small 
and big stocks. Similarly, HML is the difference in annualized average of the monthly returns 
RQ WKH6WDQGDUG	3RRU¶V 6	3 WRWDO UHWXUQ LQGH[RQJURZWK stocks and value stocks. We 
obtain country level total return index data from Thompson Reuters. 
  
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1. Summary analysis 
Based on MSCI definition, our sample country comprises 23 developed countries and 
21 emerging countries from 2001 to 2014. In Panel A of Table 1, we present the sample mean 
for the various proxies of cost of capital (columns 2-5),17 and the international portfolio bias 
measures are reported in the remaining columns. Matching summary figures are presented in 
Panel B, for emerging versus developed markets. Finally, Panel C reports the sample average 
for the top 10 and bottom 10 countries, sorted on the basis of CPIS_HB. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Consistent with expectations, the values in Panels A and B show that developed 
countries exhibit a lower cost of capital relative to their emerging market counterparts. The 
lowest cost of capital in terms of historical risk premium is observed for Ireland followed by 
the Ireland, New Zealand, Japan, US, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, Belgium, Hong 
                                                          
16 For further details on the method see ICRG (2012). 
17 We report the summary statistics of the control variables in Appendix 1. 
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Kong, and Canada. Conversely, the countries ranking with the highest costs of capital are the 
Brazil, Czech Republic, Egypt, Bulgaria, Thailand, Peru, Indonesia, Poland, Turkey, and 
Romania. The other three cost of capital proxies show a similar pattern.  
In terms of the three alternative measures of sub-optimal portfolio allocations (i.e. 
CPIS_HB, CPIS_FB and GF_FB) Panels A and B reveal that the top ten countries showing 
the lowest home bias, i.e. CPIS_HB, are mostly developed countries with the lowest being the 
US followed by Japan, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Canada, Ireland, Italy and 
Hong Kong. Conversely, countries with the strongest home bias are mainly emerging 
markets; the lowest is Bulgaria, followed by Romania, Peru, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Argentina, Czech Republic, Malaysia, and Philippines. In terms of CPIS_FB (and GF_FB), it 
is unsurprising that European countries predominantly occupy the top ten countries, 
attributable to being in the same economic union. Nonetheless, we still observe that most 
developed countries have a stronger positive foreign bias, i.e. these countries mostly 
preferred by international investors, compared to the emerging markets.  
The above analysis clearly indicates that countries with the lowest cost of capital tend 
to be associated with weaker home bias by their home investors and stronger foreign bias by 
international investors. Panel C of Table 1 further supports this view as the lowest home bias 
for the top ten countries is 2.29 compared to the home bias of the bottom ten countries of 
7.15. Comparing this with cost of capital measures, we see that the top ten countries¶DYHUDJH 
HRRm is 8.3% (with rCred = 2.93, CERP = 5% and DY = 2.53%) compared to the bottom ten 
HRRm of 24.70% (with rCred = 12.09, CERP = 11.10% and DY = 4.04%).  Similar results 
are observed when we relate the foreign bias measures (CPIS_FB = 0.44 and GF_FB = 0.02 
for top ten countries) and CPIS_FB = -1.30 and GF_FB = -2.24 for bottom ten countries. In 
conclusion this summary analysis in Table 1 is strongly suggestive that countries with a lower 
home bias (higher foreign bias) tend to be associated with a lower cost of capital.  
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4.2. Correlation analysis 
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficient matrix between all the variables we use in 
our analysis. In line with expectations, CPIS_HB is positively and significantly correlated 
with all of cost of capital measures. This indicates that, from a simple univariate perspective 
countries with a greater home bias suffer from a higher cost of capital. This is consistent with 
our summary analysis. Similarly, the CPIS_FB measure is negatively correlated with cost of 
capital proxies, suggesting that countries which are favoured by foreign investors are 
associated with a lower cost of capital. Furthermore, the GF_FB measure also shows negative 
and statistically significant correlation coefficients, again providing support to the previous 
findings in Table 1.  Most of the other correlation coefficients display expected signs. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
4.3. Regression results 
This section examines whether and to what extent the cross-sectional and temporal 
variations in home biases of domestic investors and foreign biases of foreign investors 
explain the international variations in cost of capital. To empirically examine this we use 
pooled OLS regressions using all of our control variables, including year dummies that could 
potentially be correlated with the different cost of capital measures. All the regression 
estimations use robust to Newey-West standard errors.  
 
4.3.1. Cost of capital and equity home bias 
We begin our analysis by assessing the impact of non-optimal domestic allocation, i.e. 
home bias (CPIS_HB) on cost of capital. In Table 3, we present the regression results 
showing the relation between equity home bias and four alternative costs of capital proxies. 
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. In each case the coefficient on CPIS_HB is 
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positive and statistically significant, at the 1% level in models 2 to 4. Consistent with 
international risk sharing theory, the results provide compelling evidence that higher home 
bias is associated with higher cost of capital. Erb et al. (1996) find that an increase of one unit 
LQWKHORJRIDFRXQWU\¶VFUHGLWUDWLQJVLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKa reduction of 10% in cost of equity 
capital. As we use the same measure of country credit rating (i.e. 1-22), the statistically 
significant coefficient of 0.235 in Model 2 indicates that a 10 unit increase in the log of 
CPIS_HB (i.e. 1%) is related to a rise in cost of capital by approximately 0.235*10=2.35 
basis points. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.3.2. Cost of capital and equity foreign bias 
Table 4 reports the results of the relation between cost of capital and CPIS_FB. 
Consistent with expectations, the estimated coefficient on CPIS_FB is negative and 
statistically significant, at a minimum of 5% level, in all four regressions.  The coefficient of 
-0.882 (t-statistic = -3.47) of Model 1 suggests that the historical risk premium is lower for 
countries with a higher foreign bias. Model 2 demonstrates a negative coefficient of -0.328 (t-
statistic = -8.76) consistent with the view that favourable country allocation by foreign 
investors is related to favourable country ratings, indicating a lower cost of capital. Similarly, 
the coefficient of -0.577 (t-statistic = -8.61) also supports the view that countries which 
attract higher foreign equity portfolio investments are associated with lower country risk 
premiums. The results in Model 4 further support the theoretically consistent claim that 
higher foreign bias is associated with a lower cost of capital. 
Model 2 indicates that a 10 unit increase in equity foreign bias is related to a fall in 
cost of capital by approximately by 3.28 basis points (-0.328*10) per year. This is significant 
because country credit ratings do not move much, as compared to country stock returns. The 
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coefficient of -0.395 (t-statistic = -4.18) also confirms that countries attracting higher 
allocations are related to lower dividend yield, suggesting a lower cost of capital. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
4.3.3. Cost of capital and fund level foreign bias measures 
In Table 5, we replicate the regression of Table 4 by using global fund level data to 
measure equity foreign bias (GF_FB). The results show the signs of the coefficients are 
negative and statistically significant across all the proxies of cost of capital (GF_FB 
coefficients -0.874 (t-statistic = -4.45), -0.570 (t-statistic = -7.56), -0.485 (t-statistic = -3.81), 
and -0.307 (t-statistic = -3.77) for HRRm, rCred, CERP, and DY respectively). These results 
reinforce our previous findings discussed above. This suggests that foreign bias is inversely 
associated with cost of capital across developed and developing countries. The results imply 
that the risk sharing benefits of international investments seem to increase as foreign 
investors tilt their allocations more towards that implied by the ICAPM. This is consistent 
with the optimal global risk-sharing conjectures of Stulz (1999) and Errunza (2001). 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
4.3.4. Control variables 
In terms of the control variables, most of them have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant as reported in Tables 3-5. MKTCap, Retn_1, Infl, Turn, LMSI, 
RGDPG and Law are negatively and statistically related to HRRm, CERP, rCred and DY.  
These findings are consistent with existing studies (see Hail and Leuz, 2006). Beta is 
positively related to cost of capital and statistically significant. Similarly, BM, Exch, PolRisk, 
EconRisk, FinRisk, SMB and HML are positively associated with cost of capital but their 
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statistical significance levels are sensitive to different specifications. Such behaviour of the 
control variables is also reported by existing studies (see Lau et al. 2010).  
 
4.4. Robustness tests 
All our empirical results provide strong evidence on the influence of sub-optimal 
international allocations (i.e. home and foreign biases) on cost of capital, which is consistent 
with the theory. In this section we run a number of robustness checks to further test the 
empirical sensitivity of our results. First, we use Tobin¶V Q as an additional alternative 
measure of cost of capital. Second, we address the concern of possible endogeneity issues 
(reverse causality and selection bias) by using two different approaches: firstly we deal with 
reverse causality using the pre-determined (exogenous) one year lagged values of home and 
foreign biases and secondly, we use the Heckman selection method to address the sample 
selection bias.  
 
4.4.1.  Additional measure of cost of capital: Tobin¶VQ.  
In this section we test whether variations in cross-country DJJUHJDWHILUPV¶YDOXDWLRQV 
can be explained by differences in home and foreign biases. To test the valuation effect and 
following the existing literature (Chan et al. 2009) we use country level 7RELQ¶V 4. The 
country level 7RELQ¶V 4 measure is constructed E\ WDNLQJ WKH UDWLR RI HDFK FRXQWU\¶V
FRQVWLWXHQW ILUPV¶ total liabilities plus equity market value to the ERRNYDOXHVRI WKH ILUPV¶
assets. Since there is an inverse relationship between cost of capital and equity market 
valuation, we expect CPIS_HB (CPIS_FB and GF_FB) to be negatively (positively) 
associated with 7RELQ¶V4. The results are reported in Table 6. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
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We show in model 1 of Table 6 that the cross-sectional and temporal differences in 
market valuations are inversely related to CPIS_HB as demonstrated by the coefficient of   
-0.562 (t-statistic = -9.60). This demonstrates that domestic LQYHVWRUV¶KRPHELDV reduces firm 
valuations, which in turn implies an increase in cost of capital. This result is consistent with 
Errunza and Losq (1985) and Stulz (1999). Home bias reduces firm value because local 
investors bear a large proportion of risk since there is inadequate international risk sharing. 
In models 2 and 3 of Table 6, the results show that both measures of foreign bias 
(CPIS_FB and GF_FB) are associated with higher levels of Tobin¶V Q. The estimated 
coefficients on CPIS_FB and GF_FB of 0.813 (t-statistic = 5.49) in model 2 and 0.448 (t-
statistic = 5.73) in model 3 respectively, implies that as foreign investors increase their 
allocations towards the suggested ICAPM allocation, firms¶ value increases, which in turn 
should reduce cost of capital. As such, using 7RELQ¶V 4, we further reinforce our previous 
findings by demonstrating that higher levels of CPIS_HB (CPIS_FB and GF_FB) reduce 
(increase) equity valuations. 
 
4.4.2 Reverse causality: Lagged pre-determined variables 
Changes in cost of capital might induce foreign investors to invest more, leading to 
reduced home bias and increased foreign bias. If this case, our estimates could suffer from 
endogeneity issues arising from reverse causality. Table 7 provide a summary of the 
sensitivity analysis. For brevity, we report only the coefficients and t-statistics of the sub-
optimal portfolio allocation values. Here we address the potential endogeneity problem using 
one-year lagged values of home and foreign bias as pre-determined exogenous variables.  
To address our concern of endogeneity, we use lagged CPIS_HB, CPIS_FB and 
GF_FB in our regressions. Consistent with our expectations, all the coefficient estimates on 
CPIS_HB in Panel A of Table 7 have the expected positive sign and are statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all cases. This provides robust support to the results reported in 
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Table 5 that higher equity home bias is associated with a higher cost of capital, even after 
addressing the endogeneity problem arising from potential reverse causality.  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Similarly, the coefficient estimates on the lagged values of CPIS_FB and GF_FB 
reported in Panel B of Table 7 remain negative and statistically significant across all the 
proxies of cost of capital. Costs of capital measures are statistically significant even at the 1% 
level. These results further support our findings that higher equity foreign biases are 
associated with a lower cost of capital even after controlling for any potential reverse 
causality issues. 
 
4.4.3 Dynamic generalized methods of moment estimation 
Despite using the lagged values the estimation could still be subjected to dynamic 
endogeneity as that past values of our cost of equity may influence the three measures of sub-
optimal allocation measures. We address this by including the lagged cost of equity as an 
additional independent variable along with lagged values of all three sub-optimal allocation 
measures (CPIS_HB, CPIS_FB and GF_FB) as predetermined variables and estimate the 
dynamic generalized methods of moment (GMM) regressions following Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). The dynamic GMM 
model takes account of unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity, and reverses causality (see 
Beck et al. (2001 Wintoki et al. (2012). The dynamic GMM estimation is appropriate for 
situation of smaller time waves and larger panels. In our case, the time period is 14 years with 
44 panels. Further, the use of lagged value of cost of equity measure takes account for the 
persistence in cost of equity measure. The dynamic GMM results are reported in Panel B of 
Table 7. All the estimates again bear the expected signs and support both our hypotheses.  
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4.4.4 Selection bias 
The 44 countries we are able to use are from the 45 all-country index of MSCI and 
hence, capture 98% of the highly investable markets. Although we would ideally like to use 
as many countries as possible, owing to unavailability of data, particularly for smaller 
emerging and frontier markets, we select 44 countries. In Panel B, we use the standard 
Heckman selection bias method to address the concern of selection biases which may 
compromise the validity of the results. The results are reported in Panel C of Tables 7 for 
CPIS_HB, CPIS_FB and GF_FB respectively. The estimated coefficients and statistical 
significance of all the regressions are qualitatively similar to those reported in previous 
regressions.   
These additional tests demonstrate that our findings are robust to different 
specifications and use of different estimation methods. The overall results of the empirical 
analysis provide strong evidence that a higher degree of home bias is related to a higher cost 
of capital. Correspondingly, foreign investors increasing their portfolio weight towards the 
global optimum allocations reduces the KRVWFRXQWU\¶Vcost of capital. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Existing studies provide compelling evidence on the prevalence and persistence of sub-
optimal international portfolio allocations, leading to the phenomena of home and foreign 
bias on a global scale. However, the implications of such biases have not been extensively 
investigated. The theory notes that relative to the ICAPM, as the magnitude of domestic bias 
in the equity portfolio allocations decreases, it facilitates the benefits of global risk sharing 
between foreign and domestic investors. Similarly, following the same ICAPM prescription 
the increase in foreign bias towards a particular host country by foreign investors should also 
positively influence global risk sharing.  
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The increased international diversification of home investors (i.e. decreasing home 
bias) and foreign investors (i.e. increasing foreign bias) should integrate the host capital 
market into the world capital market. The benefits of such growing market integration should 
ultimately manifest itself in the reduction of cost of capital. This suggests that the cross-
sectional and temporal variations in home and foreign bias should, in part, explain the 
differences in the cross-country cost of capital. To be specific, home bias (foreign bias) 
should be associated with a higher (lower) cost of capital. In this study we provide 
comprehensive, robust and extensive tests of such conjectures. 
We use global macro and a unique fund level micro data on 44 cross-countries 
(developed and emerging) portfolio allocations to construct the home and foreign bias 
measures. Similarly, following the existing literature we employ five different proxies of cost 
of capital. Applying robust econometric techniques and a broad spectrum of regression 
specifications, our study finds that consistent with the theory, countries with higher degree of 
equity home bias exhibit a higher level of cost of capital. Similarly, higher degrees of foreign 
bias exhibited by foreign investors in their equity country allocations lower cost of capital for 
the host countries.  
The policy implication of the study indicates that governments, particularly in 
emerging markets, should initiate reforms for attracting foreign equity investors and 
encourage domestic investor to diversify internationally. 
 
29 
 
Appendix 1 
Control variables 
Country 
MKTCap 
(in USD 
millions) 
Beta 
BM  
(Ratio) 
Retn_1  
(%) 
Exch(Cov.of 
% in 
decimals) 
Infl  
(%) 
Turn 
(%) 
LSMI 
(% of 
GDP) 
RGDP  
(%) 
Law  
(0-6) 
PolRisk  
(0-100) 
EconRisk 
(0-50) 
FinRisk  
(0-50) 
SMB  
(%) 
HML  
(%) 
Argentina 16597.6 1.35 0.65 8.2 3.1 10.5 9.4 33.52 3.8 3.21 70.2 32.43 31.15 3.56 1.99 
Australia 76437.1 0.86 0.49 5.6 0.8 2.8 85.06 41.26 2.96 5.81 87.3 29.1 36.09 4.85 0.3 
Austria 55971.06 0.83 0.58 3.8 0.2 2.1 45.73 96.34 1.41 5.85 85.1 33.65 38.43 4.91 -0.69 
Belgium 177872.64 0.94 0.5 1.9 0.3 2 44.12 149.03 1.3 4.7 82.1 42.97 27.78 2.57 4.55 
Brazil 557517.31 2.1 1.36 16.3 1.8 6.5 34.01 25.98 3.24 2.33 66.5 34.98 32.63 12.73 4.57 
Bulgaria 50205.06 1.33 1.44 11.2 3.8 4.8 16.46 109.77 3.3 3.89 74.6 31.08 32.3 5.94 1.52 
Canada 1062678.2 0.97 0.29 5.4 1.1 1.9 74.21 66.91 20.4 5.85 85.6 41.84 29.5 8.93 0.27 
Chile 103693 1.05 0.98 12.6 1.5 3.7 15.69 68.95 4 4.85 76.5 40.14 25.74 3.54 -0.09 
China 852176.43 1.27 1.08 11.8 1.7 2.4 131.5 50.82 9.82 3.93 65.4 37.37 46.5 1.16 3.76 
Czech Rep 32290.32 0.92 1.37 8.5 2 2.3 56.23 124.68 2.48 5.15 80.7 36.91 31.03 9.45 -6.07 
Denmark 135541.4 0.89 0.71 1.9 1.4 1.9 78.25 93.73 0.6 5.68 85.2 43.53 41.92 1.23 -1.16 
Egypt 2576.38 1.08 1.35 11.4 1.9 8.6 36.16 51.51 4.06 3.92 65 34.5 33.46 6.96 5.97 
Finland 145078.72 1.58 0.57 7.2 0.9 1.7 117.47 76.14 1.24 5.85 91.6 45.22 37.21 13.35 -2.29 
France 1433148.5 1.15 0.35 1.9 0.9 1.6 96.91 54.82 1.1 4.62 76 34.92 30.69 7.42 -1.46 
Germany 1029900.5 1.28 0.36 2.7 4.6 1.6 136.98 74.98 1.03 4.55 82.3 36.07 26.22 5.36 -1.54 
Greece 60205.06 1.58 0.86 7.3 4.2 2.6 47.92 55.58 -0.01 3.55 75.3 34.77 32.76 0.59 -4.68 
Hong Kong 440528.31 1.1 1.12 2.5 0.7 1.6 88.32 387.19 3.81 4.66 79.6 43.84 41.38 5.62 -3.3 
Hungary 20268.97 1.27 0.63 8.6 0.9 4.8 75.92 146.06 1.87 4.3 80.9 34.87 35.64 -7.84 6.39 
India 513995.72 1.15 0.9 10.2 1.82 7.1 105.76 43.74 7.25 3.7 57.9 33.53 37.38 11.58 -9.46 
Indonesia 122670.88 1.29 1.06 7.4 1.9 7.7 49.34 54.66 5.37 2.92 55 36.83 24.54 -2.51 3.25 
Ireland 56974.99 0.86 0.45 7.8 0.9 2.2 42.88 162.49 2.35 5.85 85.7 41.85 35.59 11.36 1.12 
Israel 80736.18 1.12 0.98 6.7 0.9 2.1 64.17 72.24 3.36 5.15 65.8 36.16 31.27 10.29 -4.11 
Italy 475029.22 0.9 0.48 2.5 0.2 2.1 142.11 51.79 -0.07 3.79 78.3 35.05 31.7 1.91 -4.47 
Japan 2840190.1 0.66 0.95 1.4 -1.4 0.1 110.46 28.24 0.77 4.85 81.2 36.28 43.47 4.55 -2.85 
Korea 578837.5 1.57 0.31 4.7 1.6 2.9 217.25 84.77 4.04 4.76 76.1 41.64 34.19 3.91 -7.75 
Malaysia 197732.13 0.79 0.66 7.4 1.7 2.3 31.19 181.73 4.86 3.27 74.5 35.78 36.95 1.15 -1.19 
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Mexico 215203.86 1.18 1.42 5.3 1.6 4.4 24.47 57.6 2.13 3.42 73.2 38.38 38.97 3.49 8.08 
Netherlands 349412.38 1.2 0.47 2.2 0.7 2 136.07 133.14 1.01 5.9 87.5 41.93 29.08 4 -0.39 
New Zealand 17449.14 0.95 0.55 11.3 1.2 2.4 42.52 59.7 2.49 5.45 84.8 27.89 26.5 -1.25 -1.58 
Norway 157211.12 1.19 1.24 5.1 1.2 1.9 107.76 69.76 1.6 5.55 84.9 44.6 44.74 0.03 -1.04 
Peru 30396.33 1.23 1.12 5.4 2.7 2.6 6.74 46.71 5.48 2.75 63.6 39.06 31.58 6.46 -16.67 
Philippines 5486.65 1.01 1.05 9.7 1.6 4.4 18.46 82.24 5.11 2.7 67.2 29.84 35.77 7.48 -1.79 
Poland 81433.35 0.87 0.8 5.8 0.8 2.7 39.71 76.85 5.58 4.45 79.6 36.48 36.19 2.1 -1.72 
Portugal 52159.64 0.86 0.36 4.6 0.6 2.2 60.56 68.39 0.07 5.05 81.7 34.63 34.6 1.96 4.41 
Romania 20605.71 0.78 0.65 9.2 1.7 9.8 12.76 77.72 3.74 3.75 66.7 31.71 35.21 8.84 1.82 
Russia 449527.62 1.71 0.64 5.1 3.5 11 67.03 54.39 4.21 4.29 68.9 37.73 43.92 13.8 -3.2 
South Africa 281863.49 1.12 1.08 11.4 2.1 5.9 50.87 59.13 3.14 2.7 71.5 35.07 25.91 7.74 4.05 
Spain 459605.66 0.93 0.27 6.4 0.9 2.5 156.54 55.76 1.42 4.66 77.8 38.29 36.77 1.94 -0.27 
Sweden 337099.13 1.3 0.31 5.2 0.6 1.3 115.6 84.68 1.96 5.98 90.5 44.64 28.42 8.15 -8.25 
Switzerland 870988.74 0.65 0.49 4.5 1 0.6 95.72 108.32 1.82 4.75 86.4 44.93 45.24 2.92 -1.64 
Thailand 139411.68 1.44 0.86 8.1 2.5 2.7 91.29 138.21 3.85 3.17 64.7 34.2 33.74 -3.66 2.7 
Turkey 118926.03 2.28 0.53 12.6 2.2 15.7 152.27 51.69 4.14 4.5 65.9 32.59 32.02 -0.53 1.73 
United Kingdom 2422145.3 0.87 0.39 4.5 0.5 2.3 137.17 56.96 1.72 5.3 83.3 34.08 24.27 5.89 2.23 
United States 12494888 0.92 0.48 3.3 0.4 2.3 202.96 26.65 1.8 4.83 76.1 27.8 30.56 4.96 -1.1 
MKTCap is the country market capitalization; Beta is the covariance of MSCI FRXQWU\¶V¶ZRUOGLQGH[UHWXUQRYHUSDVWILYH\HDUVGLYLGHGE\MSCI world index return variance; BM is the log country level ratio of book-
to-market; Retn_1   is the average MSCI monthly index return over the past year; Exch is the three year moving average covariance of the monthly stock market index return with the monthly depreciation of the 
domestic currency with respect to the dollar; Infl is the following year's percentage change in the consumer price index; Turn is the ratio of the total traded volume of stock in a year divided by market capitalization; 
LSMI is the stock market integration measured as the ratio of a country's annual exports plus imports divided by GDP; RGDPG is the real growth rate in the domestic product; Law represents the rule of law index of a 
country; PolRisk is the political risk index of a country; EconRisk represents the economic risk index of a country; FinRisk is the financial risk of a country; SMB is return based-factor and is measured as small-stock 
minus big-stock; HML is return based-factor and is measured as high-book-to-market minus low-book-to-market.  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of dependent and key independent variables 
Country HRRm 
(%) 
rCred 
(1-22) 
CERP 
(%) 
DY (% of 
price) 
CPIS_HB CPIS_FB GF_FB 
Argentina 23 16.6 16 3.44 6.60 -0.53 -2.36 
Australia 12 2.8 7 3.20 3.40 -0.19 -0.44 
Austria 11 2.7 8 1.88 4.18 0.89 -0.48 
Belgium 9 2.6 7 2.34 3.30 0.74 -0.49 
Brazil 33 14.2 13 4.56 5.34 -2.37 -1.22 
Bulgaria 29 14.7 11 3.27 9.59 -2.11 -2.56 
Canada 10 2.1 4 2.11 2.81 -0.07 -0.64 
Chile 20 5.4 8 4.74 5.33 -0.24 -2.88 
China 13 8.3 9 3.68 3.15 -2.13 -1.37 
Czech Republic 30 7.2 7 4.53 6.40 0.09 -1.96 
Denmark 13 2.5 4 1.23 4.22 0.46 -0.43 
Egypt 29 11.6 7 5.42 7.27 -1.02 -3.28 
Finland 17 2.0 6 2.73 4.15 0.34 0.26 
France 11 2.0 6 2.57 2.62 0.44 0.13 
Germany 15 2.0 5 2.34 2.19 0.55 0.08 
Greece 17 9.3 9 5.26 4.72 0.18 -0.85 
Hong Kong 9 5.7 7 3.45 2.87 0.17 0.87 
Hungary 19 6.8 7 3.66 6.98 -0.44 -1.75 
India 21 13.4 12 3.28 4.76 -4.79 -2.42 
Indonesia 26 15.1 15 3.77 6.95 -1.31 -2.18 
Ireland 5 2.2 4 2.35 2.84 1.53 -0.35 
Israel 13 5.8 5 2.94 4.68 -0.28 -0.27 
Italy 11 3.6 5 3.15 2.84 0.58 -0.06 
Japan 5 5.7 7 1.75 1.70 0.21 -0.14 
Korea 14 7.9 9 2.08 4.56 -0.72 -0.26 
Malaysia 19 8.8 10 4.28 6.21 -1.06 -2.73 
Mexico 17 10.5 11 2.97 5.35 -1.93 -1.24 
Netherlands 6 2.0 4 3.65 2.31 0.66 0.20 
New Zealand 5 2.2 4 3.55 5.77 0.18 0.84 
Norway 13 2.0 5 2.47 3.87 0.70 -0.14 
Peru 26 12.4 12 4.36 7.63 -0.60 -2.32 
Philippines 23 13.1 13 3.93 6.20 -3.81 -1.61 
Poland 25 6.8 9 3.68 5.97 -0.71 -3.27 
Portugal 12 5.2 7 3.24 5.28 0.60 -0.14 
Romania 23 14.6 13 3.71 7.64 -2.17 -1.68 
Russia 14 12.8 14 3.47 4.90 -3.46 -3.16 
South Africa 19 8.6 11 4.20 4.78 -0.48 -2.65 
Spain 14 2.2 6 2.83 3.09 0.04 -0.43 
Sweden 10 2.2 5 2.30 3.75 0.27 0.09 
Switzerland 6 2.0 4 1.64 3.11 0.33 0.13 
Thailand 26 10.2 12 4.21 5.83 -0.96 -1.68 
Turkey 24 16.3 15 2.83 5.44 -3.64 -2.53 
United Kingdom 6 2.0 4 2.42 2.03 0.35 0.26 
United States 5 2.0 4 1.54 0.65 -0.07 -0.13 
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Table 1 cont. 
Panel B: Averages of the developed and emerging countries. 
Country HRRm 
(%) 
rCred 
(1-22) 
CERP 
(%) 
DY (% 
of price) 
CPIS_HB CPIS_FB GF_FB 
Developed 10.21 3.17 5.52 2.65 3.32 0.37 -0.09 
Emerging 22.52 11.21 11.14 3.81 6.04 -1.05 -2.15 
 
Panel C: Averages of the top and bottom 10 countries. 
Country HRRm 
(%) 
rCred 
(1-22) 
CERP 
(%) 
DY (% 
of price) 
CPIS_HB CPIS_FB GF_FB 
Top10 8.3 2.93 5 2.53 2.29 0.44 0.02 
Bottom10 24.7 12.09 11.10 4.04 7.15 -1.30 -2.24 
Note: The variables in columns 2-5 are cost of capital measures. ܪܴܴ݉ is the historical realized market return measured as 
the historical average of excess country equity market return over risk free rate. ݎܥݎ݁݀ is the natural log of numerical values 
based on 0RRG\¶VFRXQWU\FUHGLWUDWLQJV. The qualitative credit ratings are converted into numerical values based on a scale 
of 1-22. We assigned a value of 1 to $$$  $$  $$ «all the way to D=22.ܥܧܴܲ is the country equity risk 
premium based on adding the sovereign default risk premium (scaled by the relative volatility of equity to bond market) to 
the equity risk premium of a base country (The United States). ܦܻis the dividend yield measured as the total amount of 
stock dividend of a country as a percentage of the market capitalization of the country.  The variables listed in columns 6-8 
are the sub-optimal international portfolio allocation bias measures. CPIS_HB is the IMF-CPIS based equity home bias and 
is calculated as the log value of the share of domestic investors in their own country's stock market capitalization (l) relative 
to the country's world market capitalization weight. CPIS_FB is the IMF-CPIS based equity foreign bias measure computed 
as the average of the log value of the ratio of foreign allocations from foreign investors domiciled in country k investing in 
equities of country l to the benchmark allocation for country l (݇ ് ݈ሻ. GF_FB is also an equity foreign bias measure but 
FRQVWUXFWHGXVLQJ(3)5¶Vglobal micro fund level data. 
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Table 2 
3HDUVRQ¶VSDLUZLVHFRUUHODWLRQFRHIILFLHQWbetween the dependent and independent variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
HRRm (1) 1 
                   
  
rCred (2) 0.49* 1 
                  
  
CERP (3) 0.52* 0.66* 1 
                 
  
DY (4) 0.14* 0.25 0.10* 1 
                
  
CPIS_HB (5) 0.16* 0.55* 0.44* 0.12* 1 
               
  
CPIS_FB (6) -0.25 -0.58* -0.53* -0.15 -0.41 1 
              
  
GF_FB (7) -0.12 -0.45* -0.35 -0.07 -0.44 0.50* 1 
             
  
MKTCap (8) -0.38* -0.05 -0.05 -0.25* -0.22 -0.16* 0.06 1 
            
  
Beta (9) 0.29* 0.26* 0.23* 0.07 0.08 -0.19 0.05 0.07 1 
           
  
BM (10) 0.18* 0.23* 0.20* 0.05 0.37* -0.27 -0.11* 0.06 0.06 1 
          
  
Retn_1 (11) 0.08* 0.24* 0.24* 0.15* 0.29* -0.24 -0.19* -0.05 0.31 0.23 1 
         
  
Exch (12) 0.16* 0.08* 0.09 0.10 0.06 -0.12 -0.15* 0.06 0.04 -0.13 -0.35* 1 
        
  
Infl (13) -0.22* -0.38* -0.28* -0.05 0.27* -0.30 -0.27* -0.03 0.18* 0.05 0.22* 0.23* 1 
       
  
Turn (14) -0.18* -0.50* -0.40* -0.16 -0.64 0.19* 0.43* 0.33* 0.21* -0.33* 0.05 -0.07 -0.23 1 
      
  
LSMI (15) -0.13* -0.22* -0.24* -0.11 0.13* 0.30* 0.08 -0.20 -0.13 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.05 1 
     
  
RGDPG (16) -0.14* -0.29 -0.29* -0.14 0.21* -0.45* -0.25 -0.05 0.09 -0.06 -0.07 0.28* 0.15* -0.06 -0.04 1 
    
  
Law (17) -0.34* -0.58* -0.46* -0.06 -0.35* 0.58* 0.37* -0.06 -0.13 -0.29 -0.24* -0.04 -0.31 0.40* 0.21* -0.23 1 
   
  
PolRisk (18) 0.27*  0.64* 0.47* 0.07 -0.37* 0.70* 0.37* -0.11 -0.15 -0.31 -0.33 -0.08 -0.39 0.28* 0.27* -0.27 0.73* 1 
  
  
EconRisk (19) 0.08  0.29* 0.23* 0.04 -0.15 0.23* 0.22* 0.12* 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.13 0.18* 0.28* -0.06 0.21* 0.26* 1 
 
  
FinRisk (20) 0.11* 0.07 0.08 0.20 -0.08 0.11 0.09 -0.05 -0.11  0.13* -0.10 0.05 -0.12 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09 1 
  
SMB (21) 0.14* 0.21* 0.33* 0.25* -0.47 0.13* 0.16* -0.12* -0.03 0.11* 0.09* -0.19 -0.14 -0.08 -0.15 -0.28 0.06* 0.04* 0.08* 0.11* 1 
 
HML (22) 0.12* 0.18* 0.26* 0.23* -0.51* 0.29* 0.18 -0.05 0.09 0.07 0.06* -0.32 0.21* 0.11* 0.08* -0.17 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.17* 1 
Note: The variables labelled 1- 4 are cost of capital measures and 5-7 are the sub-optimal international portfolio allocation bias measures. They are described in Table 1.  The other variables include MKTCap as the log country market capitalization; 
Beta is the covariance of MSCI all country's world index return over the past five years divided by the MSCI world index return variance; BM is the log country level ratio of book-to-market; Retn_1  is the average MSCI monthly index return over 
the past year; Exch is the three year moving average covariance of the monthly stock market index return with the monthly change of the domestic currency with respect to the dollar; Infl is the one year  lagged rate of inflation based on the consumer 
price index; Turn is the ratio of the total traded volume of stock in a year divided by market capitalization; LSMI is a measure of market integration measured as the ratio of a country's annual exports plus imports divided by GDP; RGDPG is the real 
growth rate in the domestic product; Law represents the rule of law rating index of a country; PolRisk is the political risk rating index of a country; EconRisk represents the economic risk rating index of a country; FinRisk is the financial risk rating 
index of a country; SMB is return based-factor and is measured as small-stock minus big-stock; HML is return based-factor and is measured as high-book-to-market minus low-book-to-market. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% 
(**) and 1% (***) 
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Table 3 
The relation between equity home bias and the four cost of capital proxies   
 
Cost of Capital Proxy 
Model (1) 
HRRm            
Model (2) 
rCred 
Model (3) 
CERP 
Model (4) 
DY 
CPIS_HB 0.826***   0.235*** 0.381*** 0.458*** 
 (5.04) (7.59) (5.45) (4.26) 
MKTCap -0.819*** -0.746*** -0.917** -0.274*** 
 (-12.42) (-7.88) (-4.23) (-6.20) 
Beta 0.788*** 0.369*** 0.225*** 0.884* 
 (6.14) (4.67) (5.53) (1.75) 
BM 0.231*** 0.564* 0.262 0.247 
 (3.15) (1.93) (1.44) (0.53) 
Retn_1 0.306 0.380 0.224* 0.366*** 
 (1.43) (1.63) (1.87) (2.74) 
Exch 0.384** 0.611 0.421** 0.432* 
 (2.51) (1.34) (2.14) (1.79) 
Infl -0.333*** -0.523*** -0.564*** -0.357*** 
 (-3.38) (-4.41) (-3.53) (-2.84) 
Turn -0.307*** -0.239*** -0.496*** -0.456 
 (-7.46) (-8.73) (-3.71) (-0.92) 
LSMI -0.674* -0.501*** -0.746*** -0.478* 
 (-1.89) (-3.38) (-4.54) (-1.76) 
RGDPG -0.257** -0.621** -0.328*** -0.556*** 
 (-2.70) (-2.73) (-4.18) (-3.32) 
Law -0.262*** -0.377*** -0.249** -0.419 
 (-5.27) (-3.75) (-2.33) (-1.32) 
PolRisk 0.220*** 0.244*** 0.354** 0.877** 
 (3.52) (8.59) (2.49) (2.14) 
EconRisk 0.325 0.278** 0.362** 0.706 
 (1.17) (2.13) (2.70) (0.97) 
FinRisk 0.757* 0.718*** 0.352* 0.337*** 
 
SMB 
 
HML 
(1.78) 
0.472** 
(2.12) 
0.539*** 
(3.67) 
(3.57) 
0.604** 
(2.26) 
0.731** 
2.12 
(1.68) 
0.444*** 
(3.98) 
0.509*** 
(3.90) 
(3.96) 
0.352** 
(2.17) 
0.482** 
(2.04) 
Constant 0.954*** 0.472*** 0.322*** 0.677*** 
 (2.48) (7.05) (8.27) (5.72) 
Number of Observations 588 588 588 588 
Adj. R-square 
Country effects 
0.497 
Yes 
0.827 
Yes 
0.633 
Yes 
0.363 
Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The dependent variables are cost of capital measures (HRRm, rCred, CERP and DY) as described in Table 1. 
The key independent variable is CPIS_HB also described in Table 1 above. The controls include MKTCap, the log 
country market capitalization; Beta is the covariance of the MSCI country's world index return over the past five 
years divided by the MSCI world index return variance; BM is the log country level ratio of book-to-market; 
Retn_1 is the average MSCI monthly index return over the past year; Exch is the three year moving average 
covariance of the monthly stock market index return with the monthly change of the domestic currency with 
respect to the dollar; Infl is the one year  lagged rate of inflation based on the consumer price index; Turn is the 
ratio of the total traded volume of stock in a year divided by market capitalization; LSMI is a measure of market 
integration measured as the ratio of a country's annual exports plus imports divided by GDP; RGDP is the real 
growth rate in the domestic product; Law represents the rule of law rating index of a country; PolRisk is the 
political risk rating index of a country; EconRisk represents the economic risk rating index of a country; FinRisk is 
the financial risk rating index of a country; SMB is return based-factor and is measured as small-stock minus big-
stock; HML is return based-factor and is measured as high-book-to-market minus low-book-to-market. All t-
statistics reported are based on Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. For 
tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical significance is reported 
against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. 
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Table 4 
The relation between equity foreign bias and the four cost of capital proxies  
 
Cost of capital proxy 
 Model (1) 
HRRm 
Model (2) 
rCred 
Model (3) 
CERP 
Model (4) 
DY 
CPIS_FB -0.882*** -0.328*** -0.577*** -0.395*** 
 (-3.47) (-8.76) (-8.61) (-4.18) 
MKTCap -0.426*** -0.980*** -0.496*** -0.580*** 
 (-3.58) (-3.83) (-3.83) (-6.46) 
Beta 0.747* 0.957*** 0.575*** 0.432** 
 (1.90) (7.61) (4.47) (2.21) 
BM 0.498 0.262 0.296* 0.543* 
 (0.23) (0.80) (1.74) (1.77) 
Retn_1 -0.375** -0.234* -0.239*** -0.365*** 
 (-2.13) (-1.85) (-3.58) (-3.92) 
Exch 0.314 0.422 0.587*** 0.548 
 (1.08) (1.14) (3.54) (1.26) 
Infl -0.720*** -0.864*** -0.452*** -0.423** 
 (-3.65) (-4.76) (-3.76) (-2.17) 
Turn -0.929* -0.430***   -0.530*** -0.376* 
 (-1.83) (-11.87) (-7.22) (-1.69) 
LSMI -0.663 -0.429 -0.563 -0.994** 
 (-0.77) (-0.91) (-0.69) (-2.18) 
RGDPG -0.334*** -0.517** -0.562*** -0.625*** 
 (-3.67) (-2.28) (-3.60) (-3.14) 
Law -0.246*** -0.349** -0.484 -0.351** 
 (-4.53) (-2.73) (-1.28) (-2.37) 
PolRisk 0.215*** 0.196*** 0.207* 0.433** 
 (4.08) (6.69) (1.86) (2.30) 
EconRisk 0.251** 0.540*** 0.988** 0.265** 
 (2.59) (4.64) (2.79) (2.58) 
FinRisk 0.411** 0.228 0.257*** 0.124 
 
SMB 
 
HML 
(2.30) 
0.207** 
(2.75) 
0.523*** 
(3.04) 
(0.67) 
0.448** 
(2.18) 
0.396** 
(2.67) 
(3.98) 
0.379*** 
(3.52) 
0.219*** 
(3.16) 
(1.57) 
0.272** 
(2.03) 
0.282** 
(2.35) 
Constant 0.242*** 0.423*** 0.863*** 0.771*** 
 (3.83) (11.38) (11.43) (4.93) 
Number of Observations 588 588 588 588 
Adj. R-square 
Country effects 
0.706 
Yes 
0.665 
Yes 
0.715 
Yes 
0.469 
Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The dependent variables are cost of capital measures (HRRm, rCred, CERP and DY) as described in Table 1. 
The key independent variable is CPIS_FB also described in Table 1 above. All the controls are the same as 
described in Table 3. All t-statistics reported are based on Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-
corrected standard errors. For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical 
significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. 
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Table 5 
The relation between equity foreign bias using global fund and the four cost of capital 
proxies  
 
Cost of capital proxy 
Model (1) 
HRRm 
Model (2) 
rCred 
Model (3) 
CERP 
Model (4) 
DY 
GF_FB -0.874***   - 0.570*** -0.485*** -0.307*** 
 (-4.45) (-7.56) (-3.81) (-3.77) 
MKTCap  -0.769***    -0.285*** -0.291***  -0.650*** 
 (-5.83) (-3.42) (-5.18)   (-6.03) 
Beta 0.765***   0.337*** 0.274*** 0.745* 
 (7.13) (4.21) (6.46) (1.69) 
BM 0.418***   0.331*** 0.954 0.731 
 (5.51) (4.68) (0.69) (0.76) 
Retn_1 -0.364 -0.466 -0.252* -0.612** 
 (-1.42) (-1.26) (-1.81) (-2.19) 
Exch 0.317* 0.363* 0.556**     0.702*** 
 (1.64) (1.81) (2.59) (4.27) 
Infl -0.308***    -0.440** -0.476*** 0.698 
 
Turn 
(-4.40) 
-0.551*** 
(-11.82) 
(-2.55) 
-0.372*** 
(-9.74) 
(-3.13) 
-0.235*** 
-(9.54) 
(0.95) 
-0.266* 
(-1.75) 
LSMI -0.394** -0.565* -0.603*** -0.876** 
 (-2.16) (-1.68) (-4.77) (-2.75) 
RGDPG -0.965* -0.745** -0.359*** -0.453** 
 (-1.80) (-2.79) (-6.82) (-2.88) 
Law -0.562***  -0.642*** -0.555** -0.526** 
 (-7.04) (-4.83) (-2.62) (-2.73) 
PolRisk 0.471*** 0.326*** 0.547*** 0.480** 
 (5.22) (6.90) (3.77) (2.79) 
EconRisk 0.368** 0.561*** 0.380** 0.696** 
 (2.09) (3.58) (2.73) (2.11) 
FinRisk 0.483 0.986 0.352 0.482 
 
SMB 
 
HML 
(0.38) 
0.290** 
(2.14) 
0.544*** 
(3.18) 
(1.22) 
0.295** 
(2.67) 
0.381** 
(2.32) 
(0.83) 
0.253*** 
(3.88) 
0.329*** 
(3.24) 
(1.16) 
0.270** 
(2.83) 
0.254** 
(2.78) 
Constant 0.521*** 0.647*** 0.356*** 0.592*** 
 (5.47) (7.56) (9.48) (6.89) 
Number of Observations 588 588 588 588 
Adj. R-square 
Country effects 
0.662 
Yes 
0.686 
Yes 
0.631 
Yes 
0.717 
Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The dependent variables are cost of capital measures (HRRm, rCred, CERP and DY) as described in Table 1. 
The key independent variable is GF_FB also described in Table 1. All the controls are the same as described in 
Table 3. All t-statistics reported are based on Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-corrected 
standard errors. For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical 
significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. 
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Table 6 
The relation between foreign bias, home bias, country bias and Tobin¶VQ 
 Model (1) 
7RELQ¶V4 
    Model (2) 
  7RELQ¶V4 
Model (3) 
7RELQ¶V4 
CPIS_HB    -0.562***       
 
CPIS_FB 
 
GF_FB 
(-9.60) 
      
                     
 
0.813*** 
(5.49) 
 
 
 
 
       0.448*** 
  (5.73) 
MKTCap -0.652***       -0.524***       -0.648*** 
 (-21.47) (-18.84) (-20.13) 
Beta -0.356* -0.235 -0.144 
 (-1.97) (-1.41) (-0.88) 
BM -0.324** -0.611***      -0.812*** 
 (-2.27) (-4.85) (-5.68) 
Retn_1 0.726* 0.644 0.523 
 (1.85) (1.33) (1.22) 
Exch -0.460** -0.529*** -0.484** 
 (-2.07) (-3.23) (-2.15) 
Infl -0.435* -0.480 -0.591* 
 (-1.72) (-1.43) (-1.95) 
Turn 0.276** 0.428*** 0.317** 
 (2.21) (4.62) (2.87) 
LSMI -0.706*** -0.812***      -0.735*** 
 (-6.28) (-7.56) (-8.63) 
RGDPG -0.585** -0.634 -0.345* 
 (-2.19) (-1.12) (-1.66) 
Law 0.338** 0.347*** 0.468* 
 (2.44) (3.19) (1.72) 
PolRisk   0.677***       0.553***        0.582*** 
 (6.29) (4.61) (5.39) 
EconRisk -0.433*** -0.388* -0.267** 
 (-3.76) (-1.97) (-2.23) 
FinRisk -0.318** -0.510* -0.465* 
 (-2.30) (-1.77) (-1.72) 
Constant     0.746***        0.829***     0.732*** 
 (14.03) (12.68) (13.23) 
Number of Observations 594 594 594 
Adj. R-square 
Country effects 
0.632 
Yes 
0.661 
Yes 
0.604 
Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The dependent variable 7RELQ¶V4 is measured as the log book value of total liabilities plus market value of 
equity and divided by the book value of assets of country݅. The key independent variables are CPIS_HB, CPIS_FB 
and GF_FB, also described in Table 1. All the controls are the same as described in Table 3. All t-statistics 
reported are based on Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. For tractable 
interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. 
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Table 7 
Robustness tests. 
 
Panel A: Using one-year lag values 
 Model (1) 
HRRm 
Model (2) 
rCred 
Model (3) 
CERP 
Model (4) 
DY 
CPIS_HB_1 0.764***  0.492*** 0.390*** 0.247*** 
 (5.87) (6.90) (5.73) (4.86) 
CPIS_FB_1   -0.766*** -0.490*** -0.548*** -0.369*** 
 (-5.25) (-5.54) (-11.02) (-6.13) 
GF_FB_1 -0.386***  -0.655*** -0.577*** -0.448*** 
 (-5.73) (-6.87) (-4.31) (-5.35) 
 
Panel B: Dynamic GMM 
 
 
Model (1) 
HRRm 
Model (2) 
rCred 
Model (3) 
CERP 
Model (4) 
DY 
CPIS_HB_1 0.849*** 0.405*** 0.502*** 0.580*** 
 (7.25) (11.16) (8.84) (7.39) 
CPIS_FB_1 -0.973*** -0.504*** -0.648*** -0.471*** 
 (-5.32) (-11.78) (-10.66) (-4.49) 
GF_FB_1 -0.950*** -0.657*** -0.651*** -0.427*** 
 (-5.87) (-10.34) (-6.46) (-5.83) 
AR (2) 
Hansen J statistics 
Difference Hansen J statistics 
0.45 
0.52 
0.69 
0.63 
0.58 
0.76 
0.62 
0.55 
0.71 
0.81 
0.70 
0.64 
Controls including country 
and year fixed effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Panel C: Heckman selection estimation  
CPIS_FB -0.728*** -0.405***        -0.391***         -0.186*** 
 (-5.67) (-5.53)    (-6.64)    (-3.69) 
GF_FB -0.670*** -0.328***        -0.745***          -0.347*** 
 (-5.79) (-13.45)    (-7.32)       (-7.24) 
Note: The dependent variables are cost of capital measures (HRRm, rCred, CERP and DY) as described in Table 1. 
The key independent variables are is one year lagged CPIS_HB, CPIS_FB, and GF_FB, also described in Table 1. 
Panel A reports the coefficients of the lagged values, Panel B reports the coefficients of Dynamic GMM estimation 
and panel C reports the estimates of Heckman selection model. All the controls are the same as described in Table 
3. All t-statistics reported are based on Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard 
errors. For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical significance is 
reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. 
 
CPIS_HB 0.815***  0.391***        0.354***     0.244*** 
 (5.76) (6.34)     (5.68) (4.52) 
